Set-valued risk measures on L p d with 0 ≤ p ≤ ∞ for conical market models are defined, primal and dual representation results are given. The collection of initial endowments which allow to super-hedge a multivariate claim are shown to form the values of a set-valued sublinear (coherent) risk measure. Scalar risk measures with multiple eligible assets also turn out to be a special case within the set-valued framework.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to establish primal and dual representation results for setvalued risk measures in conical markets, thus extending the results of [10] to the case of random exchange rates at terminal time. The model includes markets with bidask price spreads at initial and terminal time, generated for example by proportional transaction costs. The model considered here is much more realistic and better suited for applications than the ones used in [10] and [13] since, for example, those models cannot be linked with no-arbitrage type results for conical market models. In this paper, we will provide the link between set-valued risk measures and super-replication theorems for conical market models, the latter established for example in [14] , [17] .
Moreover, new features will turn up in the random exchange rate case, most notably that risk measures may not be compatible with the chosen market model. This means that some risk measures may not yield all risk compensating initial positions for some random payoffs, since results of trading operations at initial and/or terminal time according to the market may not be part of the acceptance set belonging to the risk measure. This could be of advantage, for example, if there is no consensus about the market model, or if one wishes to be very conservative.
From a mathematical point of view, we show that compatibility with the market at initial time determines the image space of a set-valued risk measure, whereas compatibility with the market at terminal time turns out to be a monotonicity property. This relationship has not been observed before: In [4] only scalar risk measures for multivariate positions are considered without reference to a market model. In [13] and [10] (set-valued) risk measures for a static market are defined such that compatibility is automatic, whereas in [5] set-valued risk measures are investigated without reference to a market model.
Finally, we shall show that even scalar risk measures with multiple eligible assets as proposed in [2] fit into our framework.
The almost natural occurrence of set-valued risk measures in market models with frictions might also boost the theory of set-valued optimization problems. The authors do not know any other application leading to a (primal) set-valued optimization problem: In the context of the present paper, a problem like "minimize the (set-valued) risk of a multivariate position subject to some constraints" makes perfectly sense from an application point of view, and this opens the door to a all new research area.
The departing point is chosen similar to the one in [2] : We are given a set of multivariate random variables which are specified according to the risk tolerance of a regulator or supervisor (in the following: regulator). This set, the regulator acceptance set, satisfies only minimal requirements. The regulator acceptance set is, as usual, in one-to-one correspondence with a regulator risk measure. The investor or financial agent (in the following: agent) may add particular features in order to evaluate the risk of a multivariate outcome of her actions. For example, she wants to (or has to) take a market model into account. This leads to augmented (agent) acceptance sets which will have particular properties, and to corresponding risk measures.
The augmentation procedure for the acceptance set as described in section 2.4 will shed new light on the interplay between risk specifications of a regulator and the degrees of freedom for agents. For example, we think it is very reasonable that a regulator need not be concerned about specific market models, but just about tolerable outcomes. On the other hand, the market model already is a choice of the agent. In this paper, we assume that the agent did choose a specific (conical) market model. If she does not feel sure about the model, she at least could either do a sensitivity analysis with respect to the market model, or just stick to the regulator risk measure. The first possibility is beyond the scope of this paper, but it seems to be a very interesting topic for future research. The second possibility is easily done using the results below.
The tools used for modeling (convex) set-valued risk measures for multivariate random variables and in particular, the duality formulas necessary to establish dual representation results rely on the approach given in [9] . It turns out that this approach matches perfectly the needs of risk measures and superhedging theorems for conical markets models. In particular, our dual variables, namely some simple set-valued functions, and the conditions they have to satisfy have a meaning in terms of the financial market model. We can hardly see how this goal could be achieved by sticking to a vector-valued duality theory in which usually linear operators feature as dual elements.
The main result of the paper is the dual representation theorem for convex setvalued risk measures for conical market models (theorem 4.2 below). It can be seen as a duality result for a set-valued optimization problem. Indeed, if one starts with a (closed convex) set A of acceptable random variables the risk measure corresponding to A is given as an infimum in a set-valued sense which here is (the closure of) a union. On the other hand, the duality result produces a representation of the setvalued (proper closed convex) risk measure as a supremum of its set-valued affine minorants. The supremum is taken in a complete lattice of sets with respect to "⊇", so it is an intersection.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we define regulator acceptance sets, describe augmentation procedures, the construction of risk measures and the oneto-one relationships between classes of set-valued risk measures and acceptance sets. Sections 3 and 4 include the duality results. Section 5 is devoted to examples the most important of which is the link between set-valued coherent risk measures and superhedging theorems for conical market models. We also include set-valued versions of value at risk, the worst case risk measure and average value at risk as well as a discussion of risk measures in a multiple eligible asset market. In the appendix, some technical results are recalled or proven.
2 From acceptance sets to risk measures
Acceptance sets
We are given a probability space (Ω,
(Ω, F T , P ), 0 < p ≤ ∞, the linear space of all such functions with Ω |X (ω)| p dP < +∞ for 0 < p < ∞, and ess.sup ω∈Ω |X (ω)| < ∞ for p = ∞. In all cases, |·| stands for an arbitrary, but fixed norm on IR d , and the usual identification of functions differing only on sets of P -measure zero is assumed. As usual, we write
for the closed convex cone of IR d -valued random variables with P -almost surely non-
The symbol 1I denotes the random variable in L p 1 which has P -almost surely the value 1.
In this paper, for X ∈ L p d , the values of X i , 1 ≤ i ≤ d, are understood as the number of units of asset i an agent holds at terminal time T . Thus, we follow Kabanov's idea [14] in assuming that a portfolio is represented in "physical units" of the traded assets (instead of its value in a fixed currency/numéraire).
Following [2] we consider an acceptance set given by a regulator as the object with "conceptual primacy [...] in risk measurement".
We consider the properties in definition 2.1 as the minimal requirements to be asked of an acceptance set. We see them as rational in the sense that every regulator would agree upon them. The first two simply mean that there is a deterministic portfolio which is accepted by the regulator, but the regulator does not accept all deterministic portfolios. The last two properties imply a weak condition of the boundedness-frombelow type: There is
Compare [8] , (4.3), (4.4) for similar requirements in the univariate case.
Note that in [2] (p. 3, (iii)) a subset of L 0 1 is called an acceptance set if its elements, interpreted as "future values of financial positions", are "in line with the risk tolerance of the supervisor", but no mathematical assumptions are required. We deviate a little from this approach since otherwise the term "acceptance set" would just be tantamount with "subset of L 0 d ".
Eligible portfolios
A regulator usually asks for a deposit, to be made at initial time, to compensate for the risk of an investment. This deposit could be given, for instance, in cash of a specific currency, cash of several currencies, units of other numéraires, or even positions with fixed proportions of several of such assets. The set of such positions spans a linear space M, the space of eligible portfolios. Without loss of generality, we assume M ⊆ IR d ,
i.e. all eligible assets are included in the set of the "traded" assets. The following two conditions describe the relationship between the space of eligible portfolios and an acceptance set:
A1a) says that there is an eligible portfolio which is acceptable at terminal time. (A1b) says that not every eligible portfolio is acceptable at terminal time. Of course, (A1a), (A1b) are stronger than the first two requirements in definition 2.1.
Risk measures
A risk measure will turn out to be a function which maps multivariate random variables into the power set P (M) of the space M of eligible portfolios (including the empty set ∅). We associate with a function R :
In the following definition, we identify risk measures among all functions into P (M).
A risk measure is said to be finite at zero if it satisfies (R1a) R (0) = ∅ and (R1b) R (0) = M.
The value R (X) of a risk measure R is understood to include the eligible portfolio vectors which compensate for the risk of X.
The interpretation of (R1a) is, of course, that there is an eligible portfolio at initial time which compensates for the risk of the zero payoff at terminal time. (R1b) just means that not all eligible portfolios compensate for the risk of the zero payoff.
The interpretation of M-translativity is straightforward if one recalls the scalar case, see [1] , [2] , [8] .
The monotonicity condition says that a random portfolio vector which is componentwise not less than another in (almost) all scenarios should admit more risk compensating eligible portfolios. Therefore, the partial order ⊇ is the relation of choice in the image space P (M).
Let a set A ⊆ L p d be given. By
If A is an acceptance set, then the interpretation of (2.2) is, of course, that R A (X) includes all eligible portfolios which, when added to X, compensate for the risk of X, i.e. lead to an overall position in A.
Conversely, we associate with a function R :
If R is a risk measure, then A R includes those positions X which have zero among its risk compensating eligible portfolios, i.e. a position X is acceptable in terms of the risk measure R if it can be made acceptable without additional initial endowment. As in the scalar case, there is a one-to-one correspondence between families of Mtranslative functions and families of subsets of L 
as desired. A direct calculation using (2.2), (2.3) and (2.1) yields
This completes the proof. Additional properties may (and will) be required for acceptance sets and risk measures. Most importantly, conditions for the compatibility of the acceptance set with the market model are given in the following section.
Market-compatibility
So far, acceptance sets and risk measures have nothing to do with the financial market. This is on purpose: The regulator should not be concerned about the question what market model "describes the reality". Moreover, we see the market model as a choice of the agent: Agents may not agree upon the model. Once a market model is chosen, one can describe consequences for the acceptance set and the corresponding risk measure. Here, we consider a one-period, conical market model. It can be seen as the one-period special case of the conical models considered in [15] . Such a model may occur if proportional transaction costs are present (see [14] and also [13] ), or a bid-ask price spread is modeled directly (see e.g. [17] ).
At initial time, a closed convex cone
is given which models the proportional frictions between the assets according to the geometric model introduced in [14] . This cone is called solvency cone since it includes precisely those (deterministic) portfolios which can be exchanged at initial time into portfolios with only non-negative components. The part of the cone K I that is relevant for the space
At terminal time, the market is described by means of a measurable mapping ω → K T (ω), the solvency cone mapping, with
random variables. We recall the following definition, see for example [3] .
In contrast to [10] , we allow for the additional randomness expressed by the measurable set-valued function K T : It reflects the fact that the future transaction costs and/or exchange rates are not known at initial time. In [10] , K = K I ≡ K T is assumed as in [13] .
According to (2.2), if a financial agent is given an acceptance set and a final payoff X ∈ L p d , she is supposed to look for all eligible portfolios u ∈ M which make the overall position X + u1I acceptable. Since trading is possible at initial and terminal time, two situations may occur.
First, the agent might be interested to know about all eligible portfolios which can be exchanged into an eligible portfolio which in turn makes a given payoff
, that is, the investor can exchange u into u ′ at initial time (and stay in M) in order to get a risk compensating eligible portfolio for X.
, that is, the agent looks for
(the reader easily verifies the last equation). From the point of view of the regulator it does not matter if the agent starts with initial endowment u or u ′ : If A is the acceptance set given by the regulator and X + u1I ∈ A, then the agent has to exchange u into u ′ and give u ′ as deposit in order to make X acceptable. For the agent, however, it could make a difference since a transaction might not be desirable for her. On the other hand, it clearly is of advantage for the agent to know all initial endowments whichmaybe after a transaction at initial time -admit to compensate for the risk of X.
Secondly, the agent might be interested to know what risks she could cover with a given available eligible portfolio u ∈ M. Of course, every X ∈ L p d such that X +u1I ∈ A. Moreover, if X + u1I ∈ A, but she can exchange X for X ′ at terminal time such that X ′ +u1I ∈ A, it is reasonable for her to consider u as a risk compensating portfolio for X, too: Indeed, there is no additional initial endowment necessary, but just an exchange from X to X ′ at time T . Since in this case
. Thus, the agent looks for
Again, from the point of view of the regulator it does not matter how the agent ends up with a position in A. From the point of view of the agent it could make a difference: Not only that an exchange might not be desirable, the chosen market model could be wrong. In the latter case, the required exchange at terminal time could be impossible leaving the agent with a non-acceptable position. This certainly is a motivation for the agent to look at both of R A and R A+L
. The above considerations justify the following definition.
Definition 2.7 An acceptance set
An acceptance set or a risk measure is called market-compatible iff it is K I -and
is market-compatible, and A is market-compatible if and only if
Of course it is of interest (and done below) to establish conditions under which
respectively. The reader may note that the question wether or not a risk measure is market-compatible is a new feature in the multi-variate case which does not occur (or is trivial) if scalar risk measures for univariate positions are under consideration.
Proof. Follows from proposition 6.5 (a), (d).
The following simple example shows that not every "intuitive" acceptance set is market-compatible.
is certainly an acceptable position. However, the position X +u1I = u1I is not acceptable despite the fact that u can be transferred into a "strictly" positive position at initial time, that is A is not K I -compatible. On the other hand, of course A is K T -compatible.
As in the previous example, the "intuitive" worst case acceptance set
is the standard example of a set which is K T -compatible, but not market-compatible in general. See section 5.4 for more details.
is the set of all terminal positions which can be generated with zero initial costs, that is starting with the zero portfolio at initial time.
a self-financing portfolio process for the one-period market (K I , K T ) (see [17] ). Thus, u ∈ M makes X ∈ L 
Diversification and convexity issues
It is widely acknowledged that convexity is a useful property of acceptance sets and risk measures. For example, the criticism against the use of value at risk as a risk measure is based on the lack of convexity.
While the definition of convexity for an acceptance set A ⊆ L p d , being a subset of a linear space, is the usual one, we use the following definitions for functions R :
The reader who is familiar with [10] may observe that this approach deviates from the one in the quoted paper where only market-compatible risk measures have been considered.
It is called positively homogeneous iff
and it is called subadditive iff
A positively homogeneous and subadditive function is called sublinear.
The above definition of convexity just means that the "mixed" position tX + (1 − t) X ′ admits at least the risk compensating eligible portfolios which could be obtained by mixing the ones for X and X ′ . Alternative characterizations of these properties in terms of the graph of R can be found in the appendix, section 6.3. Moreover, the values of a convex set-valued function R are convex (choose X = X ′ in the above definition), and R (0) is a cone if R is positively homogeneous. If R is sublinear, then the convex cone R (0) is included in the recession cone of R (X) for each X since
be an acceptance set which is convex (closed under addition, a cone). Then, R A is a convex (subadditive, positively homogeneous) risk measure. Conversely, let R : L p d → P (M) be a convex (subadditive, positively homogeneous) risk measure. Then, A R is an acceptance set which is convex (closed under addition, a cone).
Proof. Follows from proposition 6.5 (e), (f), (g).
As usual, a sublinear risk measure is called coherent. We immediately obtain the one-to-one correspondence between coherent risk measures (and being finite at zero) and acceptance set which are convex cones (and satisfying (A1a), (A1b)).
Remark 2.14 If the acceptance set A is convex (a cone), then the market-compatible augmented acceptance set
1I again is convex (a cone).
Closedness
Closedness assumptions are inevitable for convex duality results. Given an acceptance set A, the corresponding risk measure R A may have two different closedness properties. First, it may have closed values. Secondly, its graph may be closed. These two properties correspond to two different properties of the acceptance set A. While the one corresponding to closedness of the graph is closedness of A in L
Of course, a closed set A is directionally closed with respect to each linear subspace M ⊆ IR 
Similarly, if A is not closed (or one just does not know), then the graph of the function X → {u ∈ M : X + u1I ∈ cl A} coincides with cl (graph R A ) (and is of course graph R cl A ). For each M-translative function R with a closed graph including the graph of R A we have
Dual variables
In the next two sections, we will give dual representation results. Therefore, we shall assume 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞ in the following. In case p = ∞ we consider the dual pair (L 
is a Caratheodory function. The set-valued map
is measurable and compactvalued. Since, for each ω ∈ Ω, f (ω, ·) is continuous and 
The following definition introduces a class of set-valued functions which will be used as a substitute for continuous linear functionals on L 
The following proposition collects elementary properties of these functions for future reference. Compare also proposition 4.1 in [10] and proposition 6 in [9] . 
The last equation in this chain is true if and only if
and since
Since E X T Y < 0 there is a u ∈ M belonging to the left hand side which is not an element of the right hand side. This contradicts
The next result admits a change of variables from vector densities Y to vector probability measures Q. This allows a formulation of the dual representation result in terms of probability measures as it is common in the scalar case. In contrast, superhedging and no-arbitrage type results for conical market models are usually formulated in terms of consistent pricing processes, see e.g. [17] , [15] and also [13] . We will discuss the relationship in more detail below.
In the following, diag (w) with w ∈ IR d denotes the diagonal matrix with the components of w as entries in its main diagonal and zero elsewhere. Moreover, M
(Ω, F T ) denotes the set of all vector probability measures with components being absolutely continuous with respect to P , i.e. Q i : F T → [0, 1] is a probability measure on (Ω, F T ) such that
and arbitrary in (L
We claim that w ∈ K M I + + M ⊥ . Indeed, on the one hand from K
On the other hand, [17] and section 5.6 below for definitions.
Remark 3.8 The reader may note the difference between lemma 3.5, (i) above and lemma 4.1, (i) in [10] . Since the cone K T is random we cannot ensure w = E [Y ] ∈ K + I in general anymore. A simple counterexample is provided by example 2.9 modified in the following way: Take M = t (1, 1)
If we take the same w, but use M = t (0, 1)
Dual representation
This section is devoted to dual representation results for market-compatible convex risk measures. The following theorem is the main result of the paper. In order to keep its formulation clear we shall precede it with a definition. Recall
Definition 4.1 Define the set of dual variables
is called a penalty function.
convex risk measure which is finite at zero if, and only if there is a penalty function −α R such that
convex risk measure R being finite at zero, (4.1) is satisfied with −α R replaced by −α R,min with − α R,min (Q, w) = cl
Moreover, if a penalty function −α R satisfies (4.1) then it holds −α R (Q, 
In particular, 
Proof. See appendix. 
produces a closed convex market-compatible risk measure which is finite at zero. This will be useful, for example, when we consider A = L 
Thus, the set of dual variables is larger than for any other market in the case
s. Such a regulator risk measure "ignores the market" in the sense that the results of trades, possible according to the "real" market model, might not be included in the set of risk compensating initial endowments for a given position X.
Examples

A remark about scalarization
In [10] , we introduced a scalarization procedure for functions R :
The following simple observation will be useful for the example in section 5.2.
. A continuity argument yields that this is also true for u ∈ M with X + u1I
We note that the optimization problem to determine the value ϕ R A ,v (X) may have many more solutions than the problem to determine ϕ R A ,v (X) despite the fact that the optimal values for both problems are the same. In fact, this is usually the case as the following example illustrates.
The case of one leading currency and several eligible assets
In their 2009 paper [2] the authors introduce the following generalization of scalar monetary measures of risk. Assume we are given a "leading" (domestic) currency (eligible asset number 1) and a set of d − 1 further eligible assets. One unit of asset i has the deterministic price π i > 0 at initial time (with π 1 = 1 and the random price S i : Ω → IR + \ {0} at terminal time, i ∈ {1, . . . , d} (with S 1 ≡ 1 while assuming that money in the leading currency is invested in a risk free manner and everything is discounted). An eligible portfolio x = (x 1 , . . . ,
Let us further assume that we are given a non-empty set A 1 ⊆ L 0 1 of acceptable random payoffs in the leading currency (we do not call it an acceptance set since we do not require further properties yet). The function 
It should be clear that A is convex (a cone, K T -compatible) if and only if
The collection
is the value of a set-valued risk measure R A at (X 1 , 0, . . . , 0), and R A is K T -compatible. Moreover,
Thus, ̺ is nothing else than the scalarization of R A (see the previous subsection) with v = π ∈ K + I . By proposition 5.1 ̺ is also a scalarization of the risk measure R A with A = cl M A + K I 1I . This shows that the risk measures defined in [2] fit perfectly into the framework of the present paper. In fact, the situation considered in [2] is a very special case of our model: The idea of investing in eligible assets is covered by the set-valued approach presented here. We illustrate this below with a toy example taken from [2] .
Moreover, the approach of [2] can easily be generalized to situations (a) where proportional frictions are present together with (b) when there are future payoffs not only in the "leading" (domestic) currency and (c) when some assets are illiquid in the sense that they can not be exchanged into certain others (in this case, some faces of the solvency cones K I and/or K T coincide with certain faces of IR d + , this would mean π i = +∞ or S i (ω) = +∞ for some i in the framework of [2] ).
Finally, we should note that the question of a dual representation of the risk measures defined in [2] can easily be solved using the results of section 4. This problem was not addressed in [2] .
The following example is the first in the appendix of [2] . Take a probability space with Ω = {ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 }. Consider the case d = m = 2, the (six dimensional) payoff space L 1 2 Ω, 2 Ω , P and the following market model:
(one-to-one exchange between the two assets without transaction costs) and
The payoff is given by X = (X 1 , 0) with X 1 (ω 1 ) = −16, X 1 (ω 2 ) = 1 and X 1 (ω 3 ) = −7.
We have
The unique minimal (in the sense of vector optimization, see [12] , often called efficient) point with respect to the reflexive, transitive relation generated by the cone K I (actually, a half space) is indeed the point (4, 6) computed in [2] . Obviously, transaction costs can be introduced in the example in such a way that the main features remain unchanged ("small" transaction costs) or such that the whole boundary of the above set becomes "efficient".
as the feasible set for a linear program with objective function u 1 +u 2 (to be minimized) we obtain from proposition 5.1 that the value of this program is again 10. The set of solutions, however, is
This set consists of all initial positions which can be exchanged at initial time into (4, 6) . One should expect that a mathematical model admits to detect all such positions since they are trivially "as good as" the position (4, 6) . Thus, even if there are no transaction costs present, but random exchange rates it makes sense to use the set-valued approach -because the latter yields more solutions among which an agent may choose.
Value at risk
We will give a general definition of value at risk which extends the one in [11] and [10] to the case of a random solvency cone at terminal time. 
as one easily verifies. On the other hand, according to theorem 4.1, equations (4.3) and (4.4) we have for the corresponding risk measure
Actually, we have W q max = W q (see definition 4.1). Indeed, take (Q, w) ∈ W q , i.e.
because of the properties of Y and w. Thus,
In the case M = IR d this risk measure provides a link to superhedging theorems for conical markets models as shown in subsection 5.6 below.
Average value at risk
We will give a dual definition of Average Value at Risk which slightly differs from the definition given in [10] . For λ ∈ (0, 1] d we define the vector
In contrast to the constant cone case
defines a market-compatible coherent risk measure according to theorem 4.2.
Superhedging prices as a coherent risk measure
In this section, we show that the set of superhedging prices for a multivariate claim in a market with proportional transaction costs can be understood as value of a set-valued coherent risk measure. This is in complete analogy to the frictionless case, compare for example [8, sections 1.3, 4.8] .
In our notation, we mainly follow [17] . We consider a financial market with d securities which can be traded over finite discrete time t = 0, . . . , T . The information evolves according to a filtration (F t ) T t=0 on a probability space (Ω, F , P ) satisfying the usual conditions. In particular, it is assumed that F 0 is the trivial σ-algebra.
The market model is given by the solvency cone process (K t (ω)) T t=0 where K t (ω) is a closed convex cone with IR
d for all t = 0, . . . , T and all ω ∈ Ω. The solvency cone K t is the collection of positions transferrable into nonnegative positions by taking into account the transaction costs at time t.
In contrast to the rest of the paper, where only the two time points t = 0 and t = T were important, we are now also interested in trading at intermediate time points. Thus, not only K I = K 0 and K T play a role, but also the (random) solvency cones K t at intermediate time points will be of interest.
A portfolio vector is a random variable V t : Ω → IR from the definition of self-financing portfolio processes, A t is a convex cone. The fundamental theorem of asset pricing states that the robust no arbitrage condition is satisfied for the market model (K t ) T t=0 if and only if there exists a strictly consistent pricing process (Z t ) T t=0 (see [17] , theorem 1.7 for the case of a polyhedral market model and [15] , theorem 18 for the general case). The definitions are as follows.
The market given by (K t ) T t=0 is said to satisfy the robust no-arbitrage property (NA r ) iff there exists a market process
for all t = 0, . . . , T such that
where A T is generated by the self-financing portfolio processes with
is called a (strictly) consistent pricing process for the market model (K t ) T t=0 if Z is a martingale under P and
The superhedging price of a claim X ∈ L 0 d can be characterized as follows. 
there is a self-financing portfolio process (V t ) T t=0 such that
(ii) For every consistent (or, equivalently, strictly consistent) pricing process Z = (Z t ) T t=0 such that the negative part X T Z T − is integrable it holds
Proof. This follows from theorem 18 in [15] in the same way as Theorem 4.1 follows from theorem 1.7 in [17] if one observes that lemma 2.5 in [17] can be replaced by condition (5.1).
An element u 0 ∈ IR d satisfying the conditions of theorem 5.3 is called a superhedging price of X. Now, we shall show that the map assigning to X the collection of its superhedging prices defines a closed coherent risk measure on L 
If the market process (K t ) T t=0 satisfies the robust no-arbitrage condition (NA r ), then R −A T is a closed coherent market-compatible risk measure on L 0 d and has the following representation
where
Proof. Condition (i) of theorem 5.3 leads to the first assertion. The set −A T is an acceptance set in the sense of definition 2.1. Indeed, the first condition is trivial, the second one follows from the the robust no-arbitrage condition (NA r ) and the third one holds since by definition, −A T = K 0 1I + L The definition of the biconjugate depends on the order relation in the image space. For K I -compatible risk measures, the appropriate image space and the order relation will be generated by the cone K The left hand side of this inclusion is nothing else then the conjugate of R expressed in terms of (Q, w) instead of (Y, v). Via lemma 3.5 we get with the help of proposition 6.7 −α R,min (Q, w) ⊆ −α R (Q, w) for all (Q, w) ∈ W q .
Vice versa, one may check directly that R generated via (4.1) by a given penalty function −α R is a closed convex risk measure.
The coherent case follows with the help of (6.4).
